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Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of investment- and education-specic
technical change on occupational transition and the skill premium in
a model with human capital. In this framework, human capital aug-
ments labour productivity and also facilitates the transition to skilled
employment. In line with empirical evidence, this setup predicts that
an increase in the productivity of physical capital (investment-specic
change) leads to very small increases in the relative supply of skilled
workers and to signicant and rising increases in the skill premium.
Additionally, reforms that improve the productivity of resources used
in education (education-specic change) reduce wage inequality and
increase mobility.
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1 Introduction
Following reductions for most of the 20th century, earnings inequality in the
U.S. has increased since 1980 such that the wage premium for skilled workers
has been in recent years at its highest level since 1910. Concurrently, educa-
tional attainment, measured by numbers of high school and college graduates
has stagnated or increased at a very slow pace since the late 1970s. These
patterns have been thoroughly documented and analysed in the literature
(see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008)). This literature has drawn attention to
rising labour productivity di¤erentials and lower productivity-enhancing hu-
man capital accumulation as the key forces driving the reduced economic
growth and rising wage inequality experienced in the U.S. since the last
quarter of the past century.
Given the importance of these developments, an extensive literature has
studied the division of the labour force between college and high school grad-
uates and the resulting wage premium to skilled workers (see e.g. Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), Goldin and Katz (2008) and Hornstein et al. (2005) for
reviews). Building on Tinbergen (1974, 1975) and Katz and Murphy (1992),
the main drivers of the skill/wage premium are widely accepted to be skill-
biased technical change and the relative supply of skilled versus unskilled
labour. Rises in the former tend to increase the demand for skilled labour
and hence the skill premium, while increases in the latter contribute to falls
in the wage premium.
As historical evidence for the 20th century demonstrates, these factors
operate via a production sector which is characterised by capital-skill comple-
mentarity (see Goldin and Katz (2008)). Models incorporating investment-
specic technological progress have been shown to match several key aspects
of the dynamic behaviour of the skill premium in the U.S. data (see e.g.
Krusell et al. (2000) and He (2012)). Skill-enhancing education reforms, in
the form of the mass high school movement at the beginning of the 20th
century and the mass higher education movement in the middle of the last
century have contributed to the rise in the relative skill supply and the im-
portant decline in wage inequalities observed in the rst three quarters of the
20th century (see e.g. the evidence documented in Goldin and Katz (2008)).
There is also a comprehensive literature which has examined the occupa-
tional choice of economic agents, usually focusing on the distinction between
entrepreneurs and workers, and its implications for skill acquisition (see e.g.
Quadrini (2000), Matsuyama (2006) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)).
A small strand of this literature has studied the occupational choices of skilled
and unskilled workers, thus endogenising the relative skill supply in setups
that may allow for skill-biased technical change and a skill premium paid to
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college-educated workers (see e.g. Galor and Moav (2000), Maoz and Moav
(2004), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010, 2012) and He (2012)).
Historical evidence shows signicant returns to education for workers re-
maining in unskilled employment in periods of increased educational attain-
ment (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008)). This suggests that human capital
accumulation augments the productivity of workers, in addition to driving
the transition to skilled employment. Despite this evidence, the productiv-
ity augmenting role of human capital accumulation of the unskilled work-
ers, while in their unskilled occupations, has not been considered in this
research jointly with occupational transition under capital-skill complemen-
tarity.1 Omitting the labour augmenting e¤ects of skill accumulation on
the current skill-type job can lead to biased assessments of the e¤ect of in-
vestment and education specic technical change. Consequently, this bias
can be transmitted, in general equilibrium, to output, transition to skilled
employment, wage inequality, etc.
In light of the above, our aim is to reassess the aggregate dynamic implica-
tions of skill-biased and education specic technical change on occupational
transition and wage inequality. To this end we model the joint determina-
tion of the skill premium, transition to skilled employment, and labour and
mobility augmenting human capital under capital-skill complementarity. We
build on the standard innite-horizon human capital model of aggregate dy-
namics (see e.g. Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) for reviews)2 and extend it to include workers di¤erentiated by skill
type, capital-skill complementarity on the production side, and transition to
skill employment driven by human capital accumulation on the labour supply
side. We assume that skilled and unskilled workers are members of a rep-
resentative dynasty, so that, although they face di¤erent time constraints,
provide distinct labour services and earn di¤erent returns for their labour
supply, the household that they belong to guarantees their consumption ir-
respective of their labour market status.
Human capital accumulated by the unskilled is assumed to equip them
with the knowledge to become skilled workers and thus to improve their
position on the professional ladder. In particular, the switch to the skilled
1See also e.g. Heathcote et al. (2009) on the distinction between educational choice
and skill formation over time.
2Our focus is on aggregate dynamics relating to human capital accumulation, rather
than the educational choice. Innite horizon models are commonly employed to study
aggregate dynamics with human capital accumulation (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004)). They have also been employed to study dynamics of occupational transitions (see
e.g. Quadrini (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)) and of the skill premium (see
e.g. Lindquist (2004), Pourpourides (2011) and Angelopoulos et al. (2015)).
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type is achieved once a threshold for the level of skill is reached. Importantly,
and consistent with the evidence in Goldin and Katz (2008), we acknowledge
that the human capital stock accumulated by unskilled workers, who have
not yet reached the critical threshold to nd a skilled occupation, augments
the e¢ ciency of their labour e¤ort. This is modeled using the standard
labour augmenting productivity channel in the literature of human capital
and growth.
To highlight the importance of allowing human capital to be both labor
productivity and mobility augmenting, versus mobility augmenting only, we
compare the models predictions regarding the short- and long-run e¤ects of
investment-specic technical change on wage inequality and skill supply to
the data. In particular, we rst estimate the impact and long-run elasticities
of the skill premium and the share of skill in the population with respect to
investment-specic technical change, using data from Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) and Cummins and Violante (2002) and nd that, while these elastic-
ities are statistically insignicant for the skill share, they are signicant for
the skill premium. In particular, the impact elasticity of the skill premium
is low (about 0:09), while the long-run is high (about 0:33).
The above results are consistent with the previous ndings of a large
literature, but nonetheless allow us to quantify the dynamic relationships
between the skill premium, skill supply and investment-specic technical
change in a way that facilitates direct comparisons with the models predic-
tions. In particular, we nd that the model matches these predictions only
when it includes the labour augmenting channel for human capital that leads
to skill transition. When this channel is missing, the model predicts higher
elasticities for the skill share and is overly optimistic regarding the long-run
response of skill supply to investment-specic technical change, which in turn
contributes to a lower increase in the model predicted skill premium in longer
horizons. The role of labour augmenting human capital is further analysed
below when we examine in more detail the general equilibrium e¤ects of
technical change.
We evaluate the dynamic implications of permanent changes to investment-
and education specic technical change. We focus on skill-biased technical
change and education since, despite the contribution of additional factors,
they are widely considered to be the main drivers of the transition to skilled
employment and the skill premium.3 We quantify these dynamic e¤ects
3Other factors that have been proposed to contribute to the observed patterns of the
skill premium and relative skill supply include: (i) internationalisation in product and
labour markets (see e.g. Acemoglu (2003) and Autor et al. (2003)); (ii) demographic and
other factors related to immigration and war periods (see e.g. Card and Lemieux (2001)
and Goldin and Margo (1992)); and (iii) institutional changes unfavourable to unionised
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in a unied framework that allows us to examine the required increase in
education-specic technical change to alleviate the wage inequality e¤ects of
investment-specic technical change.
We rst nd that a permanent increase in investment-specic technical
change leads to improvements in aggregate outcomes, but implies sizeable
increases in the skill premium, while having negligible e¤ects on skill supply.
The rising skill premium incorporates incentives for human capital creation
to facilitate the transition to skill. However, as human capital increases, the
e¤ective return to unskilled work time also increases, given the labour aug-
menting role of human capital, and this e¤ectively mediates the desirability
of transition to skill. In turn, the relatively low increase in the skill supply is
not su¢ cient to o¤set the skill-biased e¤ects of increased capital accumula-
tion, leading to an equilibrium with low mobility and high wage inequality.
These results provide the intuition behind the role of labour augmenting hu-
man capital in helping the model to match the elasticities of the skilled share
and skill premium in the data, as was noted earlier.
Second, we consider the e¤ects of a permanent increase in education-
specic technical change, which improves the e¤ectiveness of resources allo-
cated to education. As expected, this increases mobility and decreases wage
inequality. Moreover, we nd that despite a short-run decrease in the wages
for skilled, in the medium to long-run education-specic technical change
raises the returns to labour for both types of workers. This is due to the pos-
itive e¤ects for skilled workers from increased capital accumulation, which in
turn is associated with a more productive and wealthier economy.
Third, we nd that education-specic technical change must increase by
about half of the increase in investment-specic technical change to eliminate
the rise in the skill premium in the long-run. This combined technical change
also implies a smaller increase in wage inequality in shorter time horizons, to
about or less than a third of the increase observed if only investment-specic
technical change takes place. Moreover, it increases average consumption and
income in the economy by about 50%, compared with the situation where
only investment-specic technical change takes place.
Finally, we nd that the models predictions with respect to the dynamic
responses of di¤erent measures of earning inequality and the skill premium,
for the above scenarios, are generally very similar. This is broadly consistent
with the analysis in Ehrlich and Kim (2007) and with patterns found in the
labour and minimum wage protection (see e.g. Di Nardo et al. (1996)). While these factors
contribute to understanding specic episodes in the skill-premium skill-supply nexus, they
work to complement the race between education and technology, which is qualitatively
the key driver of the main stylised facts (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008) for a detailed
analysis).
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U.S. data (see e.g. Heathcote et al. (2010)).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the
theoretical model and Section 3 discusses its quantitative implementation
and evaluates its predictions regarding short- and long-run elasticities of
skill supply and skill premium with respect to investment-specic technical
change. Section 4 analyses the e¤ects of investment- and education-specic
technical change and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we develop a model with a vertical division of labour into
two professional types, skilled and unskilled, allowing for occupational tran-
sition from unskilled to skilled. To increase their level of skill, unskilled
workers accumulate human capital, which is also augmenting their produc-
tivity while unskilled. Transition to skilled employment is thus incorporated
by allowing unskilled members to switch to skilled status once their level
of skill reaches a threshold level. We use a closed-economy setup where a
representative household is an innitely-lived dynasty with both types of
workers/members.4 These members di¤er in the type of labour services they
o¤er. Unskilled workers accumulate human capital as a function of time and
expenditure allocated to education.
The rms use capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour to produce a
homogeneous product. Since skilled labour is more complementary to capital
than unskilled, capital accumulation, as well as technological developments
that are capital augmenting, favour the skilled wage premium. In contrast,
increases in the relative supply of skilled labour tend to reduce the skill
premium.
Compared to the relevant literature, our modeling highlights labour and
mobility augmenting human capital accumulation and occupational transi-
tion under capital-skill complementarity. All these ingredients are an impor-
tant part of the experience of the 20th century. In particular, capital-skill
complementarity is consistent with empirical and historical evidence (see e.g.
Goldin and Katz (2008) and Krusell et al. (2000)). Moreover, skilled and
4The modelling assumption that the population is made up by a representative house-
hold composed of members which di¤er in their labour market position is a standard
modelling device in dynamic macroeconomic models with two-state heterogeneity in the
labour market since Merz (1995). Examples include the models incorporating search and
matching labour market frictions and unemployment (see e.g. Rogerson and Shimer (2011)
and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)). We adapt this modelling device here to capture a two-
state heterogeneity in the labour market consisting of skilled and unskilled workers.
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unskilled workers are di¤erent entities, and human capital accumulation re-
lated to college education leads to transition to skilled employment (see e.g.
the data discussed in Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). Finally, human capital is
labour-augmenting, in addition to its indirect productivity-augmenting role
(see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008)).
2.1 Human capital and skill acquisition
The numbers of skilled and unskilled members at the start of time t for the
representative household are denoted as N st 1 and N
u
t 1 respectively. Thus,
the total size of the household (population) is Nt 1 = N st 1 + N
u
t 1.
5 The
respective population shares are dened as nst 1 = N
s
t 1=Nt 1 and n
u
t 1 =
Nut 1=Nt 1, where fNtg1t=0 is assumed to grow at an exogenous net rate,
 = Nt
Nt 1
  1, to allow new unskilled members to join the household.
The head of the household makes all decisions and treats all members
symmetrically, so that unskilled household members are identical regarding
their human capital accumulation. In particular, we assume that an unskilled
household accumulates knowledge in the form of human capital, which re-
quires the use of both time and goods (see e.g. Ben-Porath (1967) and Trostel
(1993)):
ht = (1  h)ht 1 + g (et; zt) (1)
where 0 < h < 1 is the human capital depreciation rate; et is time devoted
to education; zt is private education spending; and the function g (et; zt) is
di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave. In addition to its produc-
tivity augmenting role, human capital accumulation via primary, secondary
and college education also increases unskilled labours potential for becoming
skilled.
More specically, when the e¤ective skill level of an unskilled individual,
dened as Sit , i = 1; 2; :::N
u; is higher than an exogenous level, S, he/she
becomes skilled. We assume that Sit is the outcome of a combination of
endogenous human capital or knowledge, ht, which is common to all house-
holds, with exogenous factors that are specic to each individual, it. The
latter are assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals and capture idiosyn-
cratic preference and aptitude shocks for transition to skilled employment,
due to e.g. individual di¤erences in aspirations, life-style, neighborhood en-
vironment, school quality, health, etc, and implies that only a proportion of
unskilled members will be able to work as skilled in the next time period.6
5The total size of the population is assumed to be large. This allows us to approximate
below the distribution of abilities in skill acquisition by a continuous function.
6This idiosyncratic term generates a type of heterogeneity in preferences and/or apti-
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These relationships can be dened more formally as follows.
Denition 1. at the end of period t, an unskilled member i becomes skilled
if:
Sit  itq (ht) > S (2)
where the function q (ht) is di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave in
ht; it is drawn from a uniform distribution and is identically and indepen-
dently distributed over time with a probability density function (pdf), f;7
and S > 0 denotes the skill threshold. The pdf for  is given by:
f =
1
h   l ; 
h >  > l (3)
where h and l are the maximum and minimum ability levels within the
members of the household.
The condition dened in (2) can be rewritten as:
it>
S
q (ht)
 t (4)
which suggests that an increase in the human capital of unskilled agents
lowers the critical level of idiosyncratic abilities required for becoming skilled,
t .
Since all decisions are taken by the household, this model cannot capture
educational choices made by individuals. Our focus instead is on aggregate
dynamics that allow for between-group wage and earnings inequality, as op-
posed to within-group labour income inequality, and we consider the case
where all unskilled members are identical in each time period before the re-
alisation of the idiosyncratic ability shock. This requires the assumption that
new household members share a common value of human capital with exist-
ing unskilled members at the period t when they join the household.8 This
tude towards education, within the class of unskilled labour, without which the proportion
of unskilled members that become skilled in each period would be either zero or one (see
also e.g. Heckman et al. (1998) and He (2011, 2012) who use "idiosyncratic disutility
costs" for this purpose). This preference/aptitude heterogeneity is modelled so that the
idiosyncratic shock received by an individual can di¤er between periods (see e.g. Krusell
and Smith (1998) for time-varying preference heterogeneity).
7Since non-linearities in the skill transition function (2) are captured by the functional
form of q (ht), we assume for simplicity a uniform distribution for it. As shown below, this
allows for an analytic expression for the equation summarising occupational transition.
8See also e.g. Curdia and Woodford (2009) for similar assumptions regarding within-
group initial conditions.
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feature implies that the model does not permit the study of heterogeneity in
human capital accumulation, and thus the study of earnings inequality within
unskilled workers, but allows for tractability when analysing the dynamics of
wage and earnings di¤erentials between skilled and unskilled workers. The
role of the distribution over it is to determine the proportion of unskilled
workers who become skilled at the aggregate level.
The proportion of unskilled household members who become skilled, ,
is given by:
 = 1 
Z
0
fd. (5)
Evaluating the denite integral of (5) gives the occupation transition func-
tion:
t = 1  F [ (ht;S)] (6)
where, F =
 l
h l is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of .
Given (6), the numbers of skilled and unskilled members change over time
as follows:
N st = N
s
t 1 + tN
u
t 1 (7)
and
Nut = N
u
t 1 + Nt 1   tNut 1 (8)
where,
t = 1 
S
q(ht)
  l
h   l .
Equivalently, the population shares of skilled and unskilled members are
given by:9
nst =
nst 1 + tn
u
t 1
1 + 
(9)
and
nut =
nut 1 +    tnut 1
1 + 
(10)
where nst + n
u
t = 1. As long as 0 <  < 1, and  > 0 equation (9) implies a
well dened steady-state, where the share of skilled converges to a stationary
quantity, given by ns = = ( + ), where 0 < ns < 1.
9The evolution of the share of skilled (9), has, in fact, analogies with the basic employ-
ment evolution equation in search and matching models (see e.g. equation (7) in Rogerson
and Shimer (2011)). In our case, the occupational transition function, t, plays a role
similar to the job nding probability in the search literature.
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2.2 The problem of the household
In this setup, the head of the household makes all the choices on behalf of
its members by maximising aggregate welfare. The household guarantees
the same level of consumption and welfare to all its members, irrespective
of individual labour market status. Formally, the household maximises the
discounted lifetime utility of its members:
1P
t=0
tu (ct) (11)
where ct is per capita consumption; and 0 <  < 1 is the time preference
rate.10 The period utility function, u (), is increasing and strictly concave.
The households budget constraint is:
ct + it + n
u
t 1zt = n
s
t 1w
s
t + n
u
t 1w
u
t ht 1lt + rtkt 1 (12)
where kt 1 is the per capita stock of physical capital at the start of period
t; it is per-capita investment in physical capital; ht 1lt is the e¤ective labour
supply of unskilled workers; wst and w
u
t are the returns to skilled labour
and e¤ective unskilled labour supply respectively; and rt is the return to
physical capital. Hence, the return to one unit of unskilled-labour time in
the job market is given by wut ht 1. Each unskilled worker allocates one unit
of his/her e¤ort time to work and education:
lt + et = 1. (13)
While in the literature to date the accumulation of knowledge from un-
skilled workers as a mechanism for them to become skilled has been con-
sidered, the labour augmenting role that this human capital may have for
the unskilled labour input, as captured in this framework in (12) and in the
market clearing conditions below, has not been explored.
Finally, the motion of physical capital is given by:
kt = (1  k)kt 1 +Bit (14)
where 0 < k < 1 is the physical capital depreciation rate and B > 0 is
investment specic technical change (see, e.g. Greenwood et al. 2000).11
10Note that at the household level, there is no uncertainty regarding the proportion of
agents who become skilled. Also, for simplicity, there is no aggregate uncertainty. There is,
of course, uncertainty, for each individual within the class of unskilled workers, regarding
their progression to skilled employment. However, by guaranteeing the same consumption
for all members, the household provides complete income insurance to its members (see
also e.g. Rogerson and Shimer (2011) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012) for examples with
shocks to employment).
11In this setup, skill-biased technical change can be captured by changes in B.
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The household, taking prices and initial conditions as given, chooses the
time paths of fct; it; zt; kt; lt; et; ht; nstg1t=0 to maximize (11) subject to con-
straints (1), (9), (12)  (14).
2.2.1 Occupational transition and human capital
It is useful for the understanding of the quantitative results which follow
below, to examine the trade-o¤s relating to the households choice of human
capital and skill acquisition in more detail. The Euler-equation for human
capital illustrates the trade-o¤ associated with choosing ht:
ht = 
b
t+1 (1  nst)wut+1lt+1 + ht+1(1  h)+ (15)
+ st

1  nst 1
1 + 

@t
@ht
where ht , 
b
t+1 and 
s
t are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the unskilled
human capital, budget constraint and skilled employment share equations
respectively.
This Euler states that the representative household equates the opportu-
nity cost of education-time to produce an extra unit of human capital valued
in utility terms, ht , to the benets, which are the sum of the discounted
future increase in net labour income and human capital, valued respectively
by bt+1 and 
h
t+1 and the increase in the share of household members who
become skilled due to a marginal increase in ht.
Equation (15) demonstrates the importance of labour augmenting human
capital in unskilled jobs when the choice of unskilled human capital is con-
sidered. In particular, in a model with mobility augmenting human capital
only, the rst term on the right-hand-side of (15) would disappear, so that
all positive benets attributed to ht would only arise because of the latter
two terms, which relate to the benets from skill acquisition.
Moreover, the Euler-equation for the share of skilled labour illustrates the
trade-o¤ associated with choosing nst :
st = 
b
t+1
 
wst+1   wut+1htlt+1 + zt+1

+ (16)
+ st+1

1
1 + 

(1  t+1) .
Here the costs of foregone unskilled work-time required to increase the share
of members that nd employment in skilled jobs, evaluated in utility terms
via st , is equal to, in equilibrium, the benets from increasing n
s
t . The latter
are given by the discounted future increase in net labour income of being
employed in skilled versus unskilled jobs plus the discounted future savings
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from not having to spend goods in the next period to transition to the skilled
pool, valued in utility terms by bt+1. The benets are further augmented by
the fact that a higher share of skilled increases the discounted future stock
of skilled, and this is valued in utility terms by st+1.
Note that, by comparing the returns to labour in the above condition for
the share of skilled labour, we can see that an increase in the skill premium
tends, ceteris paribus, to increase the benets of employment in the skilled
sector and is thus expected to increase job mobility. However, at the same
time, an increase in human capital (which is required to increase the transi-
tion to skill) acts to decrease the benets of skilled employment, by closing
the gap between the returns to skilled and unskilled workers. Hence, while
being the engine of occupational transition, human capital also incorporates
e¤ects that work to mediate the desirability of this transition.
2.3 The rm
There are N ft 1 identical rms at the start of time t. For simplicity, we
assume that the number of rms equals the number of household members
which implies N ft = (1 + )N
f
t 1. Each rm produces output, y
f
t , using
physical capital, kft , and the two distinct types of labour, unskilled, l
u;f
t , and
skilled, ls;ft , where the latter is relatively more complementary to capital than
unskilled labour. The production function is given by a constant returns to
scale technology with respect to its three inputs:
yft = Y

ls;ft ; l
u;f
t ; k
f
t

. (17)
Each rm acts competitively by choosing inputs, kft , l
s;f
t and l
u;f
t , to
maximise prots:
ft  yft   rtkft   wst ls;ft   wut lu;ft (18)
subject to the technology constraint, (17). In equilibrium, prots, ft , are
zero.
2.4 Market-clearing conditions
The market-clearing conditions for capital, skilled labour, unskilled labour
and goods are respectively:
kft = kt 1 (19)
ls;ft = n
s
t 1 (20)
lu;ft = n
u
t 1ht 1lt (21)
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yft = ct + kt   (1  ) kt 1 + nut 1zt (22)
where (22) also gives the resource constraint of the economy.
2.5 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
The decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is dened as follows.
Denition 2. The DCE is an allocation sequence fct; it; zt; kt; lt; et; ht; nstg1t=0,
a price sequence fwst ; wut ; rtg1t=0 and initial conditions for k0, h0, and ns0 such
that:
1. the representative household and rm undertake their respective opti-
mization problems assuming that all household members of a specic
skill type are symmetric;
2. all budget constraints are satised; and
3. all markets clear.
3 Quantitative specication and evaluation
In this section we implement the model quantitatively by specifying func-
tional forms for utility, education, skill acquisition, and production. We
calibrate the model so that it is consistent with U.S. data averages over the
1963-2000 period, for which data for the key variables, i.e. skill premium, skill
share and investment-specic technical change are available. To proceed, we
rst estimate the elasticities capturing the e¤ect of investment-specic tech-
nical change on the skill premium and the skill share in the data. We then
calibrate and solve the model and evaluate the importance of the labour aug-
menting channel of human capital in allowing the model predictions regarding
these elasticities to cohere with the data.
3.1 Data analysis: skill premium, skill share and in-
vestment specic technical change
We use annual data for the U.S. economy from 1963-2000. Data on the
skill premium and the skill share are from Acemoglu and Autor (2011). In
particular, the skill premium refers to the ratio of the college to high school
wages (as used in e.g. Figure 1 in Acemoglu and Autor (2011)), while the
skill share refers to the share of college educated workers in e¤ective units
(used to construct e.g. the ratio of college to high school supply in Figure
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2 in Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). We plot these two series in Figure 1
below together with the series of investment-specic technical change from
Cummins and Violante (2002).12 Cummins and Violente (2002) calculate the
series for investment-specic technical change as the ratio of the o¢ cial NIPA
price index of consumption (non-durables and services) to the Cummins-
Violante quality adjusted price index of total investment (equipment and
structures).13
[Figure 1 here]
The series in Figure 1 summarise the main stylised facts regarding the
evolution of wage inequality in recent decades that have been extensively doc-
umented and analysed in the literature. In particular, much discussion has
concentrated on the relative stability and decline of the skill premium up to
the early 1980s, and its increase thereafter. The latter is typically attributed
to the combination of the slowdown of skilled supply and the rapid increase
in investment-specic technical change, which, under capital-skill comple-
mentarity, acts as skill-biased technical change. Hence, investment-specic
technical change is positively related to the skill premium in the literature.14
At the same time, the evolution of the skill supply and investment-specic
technical change point to a weak relationship between the growth in the two
quantities, and why it is the case is indeed a pertinent question in the lit-
erature, given that skill-biased technological change should create economic
incentives to educate and thus increase the supply of skill (see e.g. the de-
tailed analysis and review of the literature in Goldin and Katz (2008)).
To evaluate the models potential to capture the e¤ect of investment-
specic technical change on the skill premium and the skill share, we rst
need to quantify the elasticities implied in Figure 1, with respect to both
short- and long-run e¤ects of investment-specic technical change on the
skill premium and the skill share. To this end, we use the data in Figure
1 to estimate dynamic econometric models of the skill premium and the
skill share, which are presented, together with the estimation results and the
12Note that in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) the log of the ratios is shown in Figures 1
and 2, whereas we plot the level of the ratio of wages (skill premium) and the proportion
of skilled workers as a share of the skilled and unskilled labour force (skill share), so that
the units of the data series correspond to the model relevant variables.
13The series in Cummins and Violante (2002) starts in 1947, so we re-normalise the
constructed index for investment-specic technical change to start in 1963.
14For instance, to quantify the e¤ect of investment specic technical change and skill
supply on the skill premium using historical data, Goldin and Katz (2008) consider a
regression of the skill premium on relative skill supply and linear and non-linear trends
that are intended to capture the e¤ects of investment-specic technical change. The trend
is estimated to be positive, while the e¤ect of skill supply is negative.
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implied elasticities, in Table 1. All variables in the econometric models are
denoted following the notation used for the corresponding model quantity,
but feature a tilda to make clear that they refer to data and not model
quantities.
Table 1: Long-run elasticities of the skill premium and skill share (1963-2000)
ln
 ewstewut = 1+1 ln eBt+ ln (enst) = 2+2 ln eBt+
+1 ln
 ewst 1ewut 1+1 ln (enst) +2 ln  enst 1+2 ln ewstewut 
OLS
Impact elasticity Impact elasticitybi 0.0949 0.0125
s:e: 0.0415 0.0359
H0: bi = 0; Fstat 5.2260 0.1222
p  val 0.0288 0.7288
Long-run elasticity Long-run elasticitybi
1 bi 0.3287 0.4833
s:e: 0.0538 0.9451
H0:
bi
1 bi = 0, Fstat 37.4055 0.2615
p  val 0.0000 0.6125
Equation t Equation t
DW 1.7051 1.6954
R
2
0.9629 0.9967
GMM
Impact elasticity Impact elasticitybi 0.0904 -0.0030
s:e: 0.0320 0.0526
H0: bi = 0; Fstat 7.9700 0.0032
p  val 0.0080 0.9556
Long-run elasticity Long-run elasticitybi
1 bi 0.3256 -0.1767
s:e: 0.0723 3.4925
H0:
bi
1 bi = 0, Fstat 20.255 0.0026
p  val 0.0001 0.9599
Equation t Equation t
DW 1.7155 1.7201
R
2
0.9629 0.9967
The models include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory vari-
able to capture persistence in the data and remove serial correlation from the
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residuals. We start with least squares results and, in addition, given potential
endogeneity of the skill share in the skill premium regression and of the skill
premium in the skill share regression, we also present generalised method of
moments estimation results, where the endogenous right-hand side variable
is instrumented using its predetermined lagged value.
Regarding rst the e¤ect of investment-specic technical change on the
skill premium, the results in Table 1 indicate that the short-run elasticity
is low, at about 0:09, but the long-run is high at about 0:33. Both are
statistically signicant and the results do not vary much between OLS and
GMM estimation. To save on space, we do not report the estimates for the
e¤ect of the skill share, since the p-values are between 0:104 to 0:124 for the
OLS regressions and 0:374 to 0:778 for the GMM regressions. Turning next
to the e¤ect of investment-specic technical change on the skill share, the
results in Table 1 indicate that for both short- and long-run elasticities we
cannot reject the null that the e¤ect is zero, hence conrming the expectation
based on the previous discussion of a non-signicant relationship.
3.2 Functional forms for the model
To solve the model and obtain quantitative results, we need to employ specic
functional forms. The form we employ for the period utility function is:
u (ct) =
c1 t
1   (23)
where  > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The education and skill acquisition functions for unskilled workers respec-
tively, are:
g (et; zt) = B
e

(et)
 (zt)
1  (24)
where Be is an education productivity parameter;15 0 <  < 1 is the elasticity
of new human capital with respect to education time; 0 <  < 1 measures
returns to scale; and
q (ht) = (ht)
 (25)
where 0 <  < 1 is the elasticity of skill acquisition with respect to human
capital.
15For example, Be can be thought of as being determined by exogenous factors such as:
(i) technology developments which facilitate learning; (ii) education research to improve
teaching methods; (iii) societal changes involving greater parental participation in the
education of o¤spring; and (iv) government education policies.
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Finally, following e.g. Krusell et al. (2000) and He (2012), the production
technology is given by:
Y

ls;ft ; l
u;f
t ; k
f
t

=
= A



lu;ft

+ (1  )
h
kft

+ (1  )

ls;ft
i 1 (26)
where A > 0 is the level of total factor productivity; ;  < 1, are the
parameters determining the factor elasticities, i.e. 1= (1  ) is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and
unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and skilled labour; and 0 < ;  < 1 are the factor share parameters.
The functional form employed implies that the marginal products of both
types of labour are increasing in the capital stock. The DCE obtained using
these functional forms is summarised in Appendix A.
3.2.1 Skill premium
The above specic functional forms can help us to analytically examine the
factors that drive the skill premium in our setup, which is dened as the
ratio of the return to one unit of skill-labour time, wst , over the return to one
unit of unskilled-labour time, ht 1wut . The competitive equilibrium obtained
using the functional forms (23) to (26) implies that the skill premium is given
by:
wst
ht 1wut
= (1 )
ht 1
(1  )  nst 1 1 (
)1  [ (kt 1) +
+ (1  )  nst 1 ] 1 (27)
where 
   1  nst 1ht 1lt. Consistent with the literature (see e.g. Krusell
et al. (2000) and He and Liu (2008)), the skill premium is, ceteris paribus,
increasing in the capital stock, as long as  >  and 0 < ,, < 1. To see
this, note that:
@

wst
ht 1wut

@kt 1
= (1 )
ht 1
(1  )  nst 1 1 (
)1 
  (kt 1) + (1  )  nst 1 2 (  )  (kt 1) 1 > 0: (28)
Moreover, regarding the e¤ect of skill acquisition, it can be shown that
in our model, the skill premium is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the share of
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skilled labour, for values of  < 1 and 0 < ,, < 1. To see this, note that:
@

wst
ht 1wut

@nst 1
= (1 )
ht 1
(1  ) (   1)  nst 1 2 (
)1  [ (kt 1) +
+ (1  )  nst 1 ] 1 + (1 )ht 1 (1  )  nst 1 1 (1  ) (
) 
ht 1lt ( 1)

 (kt 1)
 + (1  )  nst 1 1 + (1 )ht 1 (1  ) 
nst 1
 1
(
)1 

 (kt 1)
 + (1  )  nst 1 2 (  )
 (1  )  nst 1 1 < 0.
(29)
Finally, regarding the ceteris paribus e¤ect of human capital, it can be
shown that the skill premium is decreasing for values 0 < ,, < 1. To see
this, note that:
@

wst
ht 1wut

@ht 1
=   (1 )

(1  )  nst 1 1   1  nst 1 lt1  [ (kt 1) +
+ (1  )  nst 1 ] 1h  1t 1 < 0. (30)
To summarise, as in the literature, the skill premium increases when
the capital stock increases and when the labour supply of skilled decreases.
In our model, given that e¤ective labour supply is driven by the share of
skilled workers in the labour force and by the human capital of the unskilled,
increases in either tends, other things equal, to lower the skill premium.
3.3 Calibration, solution and evaluation
We calibrate the model by rst using values that are standard in the literature
and then choose the remaining parameters so that the models steady-state
is consistent with the relevant annual data for the U.S. economy from 1963-
2000. The parameters for the model in Section 2 are shown in Table 2.
With respect to commonly employed values in the literature, we set the:
(i) rate of time preference,  = 0:98; (ii) depreciation rate on physical cap-
ital,  = 0:10; (iii) coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,  = 2; and (iv) net
population growth rate,  = 0:01. We follow Perli and Sakellaris (1998) and
set the depreciation rate on human capital as h = 0:10. We normalise the
exogenous productivity parameters, i.e. A, B, Be and the exogenous skill
threshold, S, to unity. Finally, we normalise the range of the distribution
of the idiosyncratic abilities, t, [0; 1].
The elasticities in the production function are parameterised using the
estimates in Krusell et al. (2000), i.e.  =  0:495 and  = 0:401, implying
elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled labour and between
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capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour of about 0:67 and 1:67 re-
spectively.16
Table 2: Parameter values
parameter value denition
1
1 > 0 1.667 capital to unskilled labour elasticity
0 <  < 1 0.980 rate of time preference
A > 0 1.000 total factor productivity
B> 0 1.000 productivity of physical capital
Be> 0 1.000 productivity of education, unskilled
0    1 0.100 depreciation rate on physical capital
0  h 1 0.100 depreciation rate on human capital
0 <  < 1 0.912 human capital to education elasticity, unskilled
0 <  < 1 0.230 labour weight in composite input share
1
1 > 0 0.669 capital to skilled labour elasticity
l 0 0.000 minium ability bound
h 0 1.000 maximum ability bound
0 <  < 1 0.590 capital weight in composite input share
S> 0 1.000 skill threshold
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
 > 0 0.010 net population growth rate
 > 0 0.455 returns to scale in unskilled human capital
0 < < 1 0.005 skill to human capital elasticity
The steady-state variables we concentrate on matching to the data include
the: (i) skill premium (1:628); (ii) share of skilled workers (0:429); (iii) labour
share in income (0:694); (iv) education-time share (0:286); and (v) private
education spending to GDP (0:01). The data on skill premium and skill
share were explained in detail above and the targets are averages over the
time period. We use data on GDP and private education spending from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database to calculate the average
private education spending to GDP ratio and data from NIPA Table 1.10 to
set the target for the labour share in income. Finally, to obtain the target for
the education time share, we assume that for the unskilled labour force total
time (in years) consists of approximately 35 years of work and 14 years of
schooling. The latter number is obtained under the assumption that workers
who are high school graduates but do not have a college degree have at
least 12 years of basic education and perhaps some years of college or other
16As discussed in Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005), these estimates
cohere well with the microeconometric evidence reported in the literature.
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training, but less than 16 years of education.17 This implies that on average
14 years out of 49 years of total time are spent in education, giving the value
of 0:286. To achieve these ve targets we set the following ve parameters
as follows:  = 0:230,  = 0:005,  = 0:59,  = 0:912 and  = 0:455.
The results for the steady-state solution are reported below in Table 3.
Given that we do not have government consumption and investment spending
in the model, the consumption and investment to output ratios reect total
consumption and investment in the economy.
Table 3: Steady-state
c
y
i
y
k
y
z
y
wl
y
e w
s
hwu
ns r   
0.736 0.254 2.54 0.010 0.694 0.286 1.628 0.429 0.0204
To solve for the dynamic paths, we work as follows. We assume that the
economy is at its steady-state at the time of a permanent shock which takes
the form of one-o¤, permanent changes in the relevant productivity para-
meter. We then obtain the transitional paths of the endogenous variables
of the system as they evolve towards the new steady-state. To solve for the
dynamics of the model, we impose the permanent shock in period-zero and
obtain the dynamic solution of the non-linear DCE system of equations in
Appendix A for T periods. Therefore, the initial conditions for the models
state variables are given by the initial steady-state. For the terminal values
of the forward looking variables, we assume that after T years the dynamic
system has converged to its new steady-state. This implies that the appropri-
ate terminal conditions are obtained by setting the values for these variables
equal to those of the preceding period. After appropriate substitutions at the
level of the DCE, the nal system is reduced to (6 T ) equations, which is
solved non-linearly using standard numeric methods (see, e.g. Adjemian et
al. (2011)). This gives the dynamic transition to the new steady-state for the
models endogenous variables. We set T = 500 to ensure that convergence is
achieved. Our results show that this occurs for all endogenous variables for
both models within 300 years.18
To evaluate the contribution of the labour augmenting channel, in Figure
2 below, we plot the transition paths, in terms of % deviations from the origi-
nal steady state, for fnst ; w
s
t
ht 1wut
gT t=0, T  = 300, after a permanent, 1% change
17See, for example, Goldin and Katz (2008) on the di¤erence between college enrolment
and college graduation for the U.S. labour force. These data imply that many unskilled
workers have attended college for a few years.
18By initialising the economy from below or above its steady state and calculating the
transition paths as described above, we can conrm that the economy does not converge
to another steady state, when the parameters in Table 2 remain unchanged.
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in B, implemented as described above. These paths are denoted as LMA on
the gure and thus capture the model predicted elasticities for the skill pre-
mium and the skill share with respect to investment-specic technical change.
Moreover, we also plot the corresponding paths for a version of the model
where although unskilled human capital contributes to skill accumulation,
it is not augmenting the productivity of unskilled workers in unskilled jobs.
This version of the model therefore only considers the mobility augmenting
role of human capital and thus is termed as MA in Figure 2. This is obtained
by setting ht 1lt = lt in (12) and (21) and it is re-calibrated to ensure that
it implies the same long-run solution for the targets of the models steady
state as described for the LMA model above.
[Figure 2 here]
As can be seen in Figure 2, the elasticities predicted by the LMA model
presented in Section 2 cohere with the empirical evidence presented in Table
1. In particular, the model predicts an impact elasticity of investment-specic
technical change on the skill premium of about 0:1 and a long-run elasticity of
about 0:34.19 Moreover, both the impact and long-run elasticity of the skill
share with respect to investment-specic technical change are about zero,
consistent with the ndings in Table 1.20 These results are in sharp contrast
with those obtained from the MA version of the model (note that the initial
values for the skill share and the skill premium for both versions are the same
and consistent with the data averages as discussed above). In particular, in
this case, the impact elasticity of the skill premium in response to a change in
B is more than 0.5, whereas the long-run elasticity is signicantly lower, at
about 0.1. In the medium run, the predictions of both models regarding the
e¤ect of investment-specic technical change on the skill premium are more
similar, although generally the MA version gives rise to results which imply
a smaller increase in wage inequality. Furthermore, this version predicts an
unrealistically high response of the skill supply in the medium to long-run,
as the elasticity of the skill share is constantly higher than the LMA version
and is about 0.27 in the long-run. In the short-run, instead, the MA version
19The skill premium in the MA version of the model is dened as w
s
t
wut
, since the return
to one unit of labour is wut and not ht 1w
u
t , as in the LMA version. If we dene the
skill premium in the LMA version as w
s
t
wut
, then the impact and long-run elasticities are
0.095 and 0.382 respectively, which is very similar to the results reported here (see also
the analysis in section 4.1).
20The economic mechanism in the model that gives rise to these results is explained in
detail below when we analyse the e¤ects of di¤erent forms of technological changes on the
endogenous variables of the model.
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predicts a decrease in the skill share, compared with very small changes
predicted by the LMA version and estimated in Table 1.
To summarise, the predictions of the model as presented in Section 2,
allowing for the labour augmenting role of human capital in addition to
transition to skilled employment, are very close to the data regarding the
short- and long-run e¤ect of investment-specic technical change on skill
supply and the skill premium. Partial and general equilibrium models in the
literature have been successful in matching many properties of the patterns
of the skill premium in the data (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008), Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) and He (2012)). Here we focused on the impact and long-
run elasticities of the e¤ect of investment-specic technical change on wage
inequality and skill supply. Our analysis suggests that the workhorse model
of human capital and aggregate dynamics can be modied to study the joint
determination of skill transition and the skill premium, and this approach
highlights the labour augmenting role of human capital that is required for
the transition to skilled jobs. Therefore, we continue with the version of
model with labour augmenting human capital, to evaluate the dynamic e¤ects
of productivity changes.
4 Technical change and transition to skill em-
ployment
We next calculate the dynamic e¤ects of permanent increases in investment-
and education-specic technical change, which are directly a¤ecting demand
for and supply of skilled labour and thus have a particular importance in
the analysis of the skill premium. We assume that the economy is at its
steady-state at the time of a one-o¤, permanent 1% change in respectively B
and Be. We then obtain the transitional paths of the endogenous variables
of the system as they evolve towards the new steady-state. To solve for the
dynamics of the model we work as described above. The results are plotted
in Figures 3-5.
4.1 Investment-specic technical change
We rst examine the e¤ects of a permanent change in investment-specic
technical change (B), which is expected to lead to increases in the capital
stock and thus in the skill premium under capital-skill complementarity (see
section 3.2.1). However, under endogenous skill supply these wage di¤eren-
tials act as an incentive for increased human capital accumulation and tran-
sition to skilled employment (see section 2.2.1). The latter, in turn, tends to
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increase the relative skill supply which acts to reduce the skill premium (see
section 3.2.1). Hence, the net e¤ect of investment-specic technical change
on wage inequality can only be determined when the forces that dene the
above trade-o¤ are taken into account quantitatively.
We plot, in Figure 3, the transition paths of the key endogenous vari-
ables of the system in percent deviations from the initial steady-state (as
summarised in Table 3). As expected, investment-specic technical change
increases consumption and output. It also increases the accumulation of cap-
ital and thus increases the marginal products of both skilled and unskilled
labour, although, by equation (28) in section 3.2.1, it favours the returns
to skilled hours more than unskilled, leading to increased labour income
inequality, as captured by the rising skill premium. The increased skill pre-
mium creates an incentive, via equation (16) as discussed in Section 2.2.1,
to increase occupational transition in the form of increases in the share of
skilled labour force. However, this requires resources (work time and goods),
for which the opportunity cost has risen given the rise in the capital stock.
In particular, goods investment in physical capital is relatively cheaper than
investment in human capital, given the rise in B, hence the household nds
it optimal to re-allocate resources from education to physical capital. At
the same time, since the marginal product of the unskilled labour input has
increased following the increase in capital (see the response of wut ), the in-
centives to increase the e¤ective supply for unskilled labour are higher.
[Figure 3 here]
In the short-run, the optimal resolution of this trade-o¤ for unskilled
labour implies a small decrease in human capital and a larger increase in
work time, which jointly imply an increase in e¤ective labour supply, ht 1lt.
The small decrease in human capital is achieved by releasing time for work
and goods for investment in physical capital, but also implies in the short-run
a very small reduction in the skill share. In the medium- to long-run, the
incentive to create skilled labour dominates the incentive to save resources
to invest in physical capital, so that human capital is increasing (implying
increases in time and goods investment in human capital) and this leads to
increases in the skill share. However these remain quantitatively small, so
that they do not work to reduce in e¤ect the skill premium, which remains at
an increased level. The reason is that as human capital increases, the e¤ective
return to unskilled work time, ht 1wut , also increases, thus working against
the reduction in unskilled work time and in e¤ect mediating the desirability
of transition to skill (recall equation (16) and the discussion in Section 2.2.1).
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4.2 Education-specic technical change
We next examine the e¤ects of a 1% permanent increase in Be, capturing an
education reform that increases the e¤ectiveness of time and goods invested
in education, in the process of unskilled human capital creation. This can be
achieved by improving education provision via, for example, changes in the
curriculum, smaller class size, improvements in teaching methods, pre-school
support for children from less privileged backgrounds, etc. Such reforms are
proposed by e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008) as a key policy recommendation to
improve the high wage inequality - low skill acquisition stalemate observed
in recent decades. Improvements in the education technology that creates
unskilled human capital are expected to increase human capital accumulation
of the unskilled and thus occupational transition. These in turn should put
pressure to lower the skill premium. However, it is less clear whether such
a policy will create benets for all agents, or whether the reduction in wage
inequality will be created by improvements in the returns to the unskilled
which do not imply increased benets for the skilled. To answer this question,
we plot, in Figure 4, the transition paths of the key endogenous variables of
the system in percent deviations from the pre-reform steady-state.
[Figure 4 here]
As expected, this reform increases human capital accumulation, which
leads to increased occupational transition, as captured by the increased share
of skilled workers in the population. These changes imply falls in the skill
premium (see equations (29) and (30))). However, the implications of this
form of technical change for the earnings accruing to the skilled and unskilled
groups di¤er between the short-run and the long-run. The di¤erence is due
to the dynamics of capital accumulation. In particular, in the short-run, in-
vestment in physical capital decreases to create resources for investment in
education, given the increase in the relative productivity of the latter. Hence,
physical capital is temporarily reduced, and given the strong complementar-
ity between the capital stock and skilled labour, the returns to the latter
also temporarily fall. However, the increase in economic resources following
education-specic technical change implies that in the medium- to long-run
investment and the stock of physical capital increase, and with them the
returns to skill labour. Hence, education-specic technical change leads to
temporary losses to earnings for skilled workers, but it in the medium- to
long-run this type of reform benets both skilled and unskilled. This is con-
sistent with historical evidence from earlier educational reforms, which were
generally broadly supported by the population irrespective of occupation (see
e.g. Galor and Moav (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2008)).
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4.3 Investment- and education-specic technical change
We next ask the question: howmuchmust education-specic technical change
increase, in the face of exogenous increases in investment-specic technical
change, to neutralise the negative e¤ects of the latter on the skill premium?
The motivation is the following. Investment-specic technical change not
only is a constant feature of production structures in modern society, but also
an important contributor to improvements in aggregate economic outcomes
and productivity (as was captured, for instance, in the context of this model,
by the dynamic paths in Figure 3). However, it does increase wage inequality
and is biased against the unskilled, who fail to capitalise on a large part of the
new opportunities that it creates, as is captured in recent experience by the
increases in wage inequality (see again Figure 3). A policy that has often been
proposed to mediate the negative wage inequality e¤ect of investment-specic
technical change is to improve the e¤ectiveness of the education system,
to provide opportunity and means to the unskilled to improve their skills.
The model developed here, by combining the previous two experiments, i.e.
considering a simultaneous increase in B and Be, allows us to quantify the
relationship between the two types of technical change that would achieve
the aim stated in the opening question.
[Figure 5 here]
Obviously, the answer depends on the time horizon set. As shown in Fig-
ure 5, if the target is eliminating long-run wage inequality, then education-
specic technical change must increase by about half of the increase in
investment-specic technical change, implying that reforms and improve-
ments of the education system must be such that the productivity of the
inputs is increased by half of the increase in technology that favours capi-
tal accumulation. Such a policy would e¤ectively eliminate the increase in
the skill premium in the long-run, but would also mediate its increase in
shorter time horizons, to about or less than a third of the increase observed
if only investment-specic technical change took place. Moreover, it would
increase aggregate gains to average consumption and income in the econ-
omy by about 50%, compared with the situation where the improvement in
skill-biased technical change was not met by any improvement in education.
4.4 Welfare and earnings inequality implications
We summarise the welfare and inequality implications of the above changes.
First, to rank order the above scenarios in terms of aggregate welfare, Table
25
4 reports the welfare gains along the transition path and at the steady-state
based on a constant compensating consumption supplement calculated as:
 '
 1(1  )
 ln U sU

 100 (31)
where U s refers to either post-shock discounted lifetime welfare (see equation
(11)) or steady-state welfare and U refers to pre-shock steady-state welfare.
The welfare gains reported in Table 4 range from a bit over 1/3 of a per-
cent to nearly 3/4s of a percent. These gains are generally lower along the
transition path than at the steady-state for each permanent change. Finally,
both lifetime and steady-state welfare gains are highest when education-
specic technical change, Be, and investment-specic technical, B, change
are shocked with the aim of neutralising the negative e¤ects of B on the skill
premium.
Table 4: Welfare gains  (%)
shocks lifetime steady-state
B 0.344 0.422
Be 0.336 0.489
B & Be 0.512 0.667
Finally, in Figure 6, we plot the dynamic paths of the model under the
three cases of permanent changes considered above for various inequality
indicators. In particular, we plot the earnings inequality ratio between the
two groups, Et, the proportion of total labour income that accrues to skill
labour relative to unskilled labour, St, and also a Gini measure of earnings
inequality, Gt. The denitions for these measures follow Ehrlich and Kim
(2007, p. 144). In particular,
Et =
wst
wut ht 1lt
(32)
St = Et
nst 1
nut 1
(33)
and
Gt =
St   Pt
(1 + St) (1 + Pt)
(34)
where Pt =
nst 1
nut 1
.
The general message from Figure 6 is that earnings inequality between
the two classes: (i) increases after investment-specic technological shocks;
(ii) decreases after education-specic changes; and (iii) when both shocks
are combined, earnings inequality follows an inverted-U pattern, at least
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with respect to the earnings inequality ratio and Gini index. Moreover,
in all cases, the patterns for earnings inequality are generally similar to the
dynamic pattern of the basic inequality in wages in Figures 3-5, especially for
the earnings inequality ratio and the Gini index. This similarity of dynamic
paths between measures of wages and earnings inequality has also been noted
in another context in Ehrlich and Kim (2007) and is also broadly consistent
with the American data (see e.g. Heathcote et al. (2010)) and cross-sectional
country data (see e.g. Ehrlich and Kim (2007)).
[Figure 6 here]
5 Conclusions
This paper extended the literature concentrating on the endogenous joint
determination of transition to skilled employment and the skill premium by
treating the former as a dynamic process depending on labour augmenting
human capital accumulation by unskilled workers. We employed a tractable
dynamic general equilibrium framework, which predicts short- and long-run
e¤ects of investment-specic technical change on skill supply and the skill
premium that are very close to the data when the labour augmenting role of
human capital for transition to skilled employment is taken into account. In
particular, this model produces a small impact and a larger long-run elasticity
of the skill premium with respect to investment-specic technical change, of
magnitudes similar to those in the data. It also predicts that the elasticity of
skill supply with the respect to the data is very small, which is also consistent
with empirical evidence.
We then evaluated the dynamic general equilibrium e¤ects of permanent
increases in technical change. Investment-specic technical change leads to
very small increases in the relative supply of skilled workers and to signif-
icant and rising increases in the skill premium. The rising skill premium
incorporates incentives for human capital creation to facilitate the transition
to skilled employment. However, as human capital increases, the e¤ective re-
turn to unskilled work time also increases, given the labour augmenting role
of human capital. This in turn works to reduce the desirability of transition
to skill. Education-specic technical change reduces wage inequality and in-
creases mobility. Although there is a fall in the wages of the skilled in the
short-run, in the medium to long-run, returns to both skilled and unskilled
labour increase. This is because a more productive and wealthier economy,
resulting from the education reforms, is associated with higher capital ac-
cumulation which has positive e¤ects for skilled workers. We also nd that
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when education-specic technical change permanently increases by about half
of the 1% permanent increase in investment-specic technical change, wage
inequality is reduced between half and two thirds in the short-run and is
eliminated in the long-run. Moreover, output and consumption increase by
about 50% in the long-run.
Our analysis focused on the e¤ects of investment- and education-specic
technical change that are fully accounted for by the market mechanism. In
other words, we did not consider market failures that may result from e.g. hu-
man capital externalities and/or credit constrained unskilled workers. Such
market failures are important in explaining persistent inequality and in jus-
tifying education interventions (see e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor and
Moav (2006) and Galor et al. (2009)) and would further increase the de-
sirability of education reforms to accompany investment-specic technical
change.
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6 Appendix A
6.1 Households optimality conditions
Consumption:
1
ct
  bt = 0 (A1)
Unskilled labour supply:
wut ht 1(1  nst 1)bt   Be (zt)1 

(zt)
1  (1  lt)
 1
 (1  lt) 1 ht = 0
(A2)
Unskilled human capital:
 ht + 
 
1  hht+1 + wut+1lt+1 (1  nst)bt+1+
+
S(1 nst 1) st
(ht)
1+ (h l)(1+) = 0
(A3)
Physical capital:
 (rt+1 + 1  )bt+1
Bt+1
  
b
t
Bt+1
= 0 (A4)
Skilled labour share:

24 wst+1 + zt+1   wut+1htlt+1bt+1   st+1

l  S
(ht+1)
 

(h l)(1+)
35 
 st = 0
(A5)
where bt , 
h
t , and 
s
t refer to the time t Lagrange multipliers attached to
the budget, unskilled human capital and skilled labour share constraints
respectively.
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6.2 Dynamic constraints
Unskilled human capital:
Be (1  lt) (zt)1  + (1  h)ht 1   ht = 0 (A6)
Skilled labour share:
nst 1 +

l  S
(ht)
 
h l + 1
 
1  nst 1

1 + 
  nst = 0 (A7)
6.3 Firms optimality conditions
Physical capital:
 rt   A

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 1 h

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Skilled labour:
A

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
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Unskilled labour:
A

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h


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
ls;ft

(  1)
i
 
 (  1) g 1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(A10)
6.4 Market clearing conditions
Capital market:
kft   kt 1 = 0 (A11)
Unskilled labour market:
ls;ft   nst 1 = 0 (A12)
Skilled labour market:
lu;ft  
 
1  nst 1

ht 1lt = 0 (A13)
Aggregate resource constraint:
Af ht 1lt  1  nst 1 + [ (kt 1) + (1  )  nst 1 ]
 (1  ) g 1   kt   ct + (1  ) kt 1  
 
1  nst 1

zt = 0
(A14)
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Figure 1: Skill Premium, Relative Skill Supply and Productivity (1963-2000)
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Figure 2: One-Percent Permanent Increase in B
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Figure 3: One-Percent Permanent Increase in B
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Figure 4: One-Percent Permanent Increase in Be
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Figure 5: One Percent Permanent Increase in B and Half Percent Permanent Increase in Be
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Figure 6: Inequaltity Measures: B Shock (row 1), Be Shock (row 2), B and Be Shocks (row 3)
